Abstract
As with much of the debate related to international criminal justice, and the ICC in particular, especially in relation to the latter's relationship with Africa, much of the positions on both sides of the divide ignore the nuances of what is a complex area of law. In the jockeying for positions, the line between doctrinal positions and normative policy assertions become blurred (and sometimes disappear altogether). The doctrinal question whether immunities of certain officials before international courts is consistent with modern international law is very often answered by the normative policy postulation that the AU should not have included the immunities provision in the Amendment Protocol. Conversely, the normative postulation questioning the wisdom of prosecuting heads of state is met by a reference to a provision in the ICC Statute. Added to the mix is very often an empirical assertion, either that a position will result in impunity or will lead to the destabilization of a country or region. Further complicating the discourse is the resort by commentators to the political rationale or objective behind the Amendment Protocol, i.e. an assertion, not necessarily untrue, that the Amendment Protocol, and the immunity provision in particular, is a response to the prosecutions of African heads of state by the ICC. 5 However, whatever the motives of the AU in adopting the Amendment Protocol, any evaluation of the instrument and its provisions must be done on its merit, unclouded by the political considerations that gave rise to the instrument. 6 This is to say, the instrument cannot be contrary to international law just because the motives of its creators were less than angelic.
The purpose of this article is to try to synthesize from the mixture of normative, doctrinal and empirical positions often advanced in favour of preserving or excluding immunities in the Amendment Protocol, the position under international law. At the outset, 5 See for an assessment A. Abass, 'The Proposed Criminal Jurisdiction for the African Court: Some Problematical Aspects ', 60 Netherlands International Law Review (2013) 27-50. 6 At any rate Abass, supra note 5, at 42 et seq. argues that it is overly simplistic to suggest that the Amendment Protocol was adopted only to respond to the ICC, pointing to, inter alia, the desire of the AU to ensure an African trial for Hissène Habré as a contributing factor independent of the ICC. See also A. Abass, 'Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and Challenges', 24 European Journal of International Law (2013) 933-946, at 935 who says: 'The pervasive, but arguably erroneous assumption is that Africa began prospecting for international criminal jurisdiction after and as a consequence of the fall out over the Al Bashir arrest warrant.' The AU's concern for what it termed the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction may similarly also be advanced as a reason for the AU's pursuit of criminal jurisdiction for the African Court. See e.g. § 9 of AU Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Assembly/AU/Dec.213 (XII), which requested the Commission to 'examine the implications of the [African] Court being empowered to try international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.' It is however, difficult to deny that the ICC-AU tension was, at the very least, an impetus for the speedy finalisation of the Amendment Protocol. See e.g. § 10(iv) AU Decision on Africa's Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (October 2013) 15 The general rule on interpretation of treaties, in Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), requires the terms of a treaty to be given their ordinary meaning in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. 16 Under the Vienna rules of interpretation, in particular Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT, 'relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties' are to be taken into account in the interpretation of treaties. On the notion of two categories of immunities under international law, see the work of the ILC, supra note 14. 17 See ICJ Arrest Warrant case, supra note 11, § 54 where the Court held that Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity ratione personae. Whether Ministers for Foreign Affairs should enjoy immunity ratione personae was a matter of intense debate during the ILC's consideration of the topic. Although the ILC decided to include Ministers for Foreign Affairs, at § 5 of the Commentary to Draft Art. 3, the ILC states as follows: 'On the one hand, some members of the Commission pointed out that the Court's judgment [in the Arrest Warrant case] was not sufficient grounds for concluding that a customary rule existed, as it did not contain a thorough analysis of the practice and that several judges expressed opinions that differed from the majority view. One member of the Commission who considered that the Court's judgment does not that there is a customary rule nevertheless said that, in view of the fact that Court's judgement in that case had not been opposed by States, the absence of a customary rule does not prevent the Commission from including [Minister for Foreign] Both the positions supporting the immunities provision and the position opposing immunities are based on doctrinal assumptions about the rules of general international law relating to immunities. I turn now to evaluate these doctrinal assumptions.
Evaluating the Doctrinal Argument Concerning the Immunity Provision
For convenience sake, I begin with an evaluation of the AU's argument on immunities. But there is a far more fundamental problem with the AU's postulation. The immunity of states officials, whether ratione personae or ratione materiae, under customary international law means, in essence, the immunity of state official from the jurisdiction of courts of foreign states. This immunity is an extension of the immunity of the state from the jurisdiction of other states based on the principle of sovereign equality of states. 46 International tribunals, like the ICC and the African Court, are not foreign states. The rationale for immunity of states and its officials -sovereign equality of states -does not apply to the exercise of jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals since, thought created by states, they are not themselves states. In contrast, the AU has asserted that to hold that rules on immunities do not apply to proceeding before international courts would be allow to states to circumvent their obligations under international law by creating an international tribunal. 47 This argument might be applicable in the case of a tribunal created by a handful of states which exercise control over it. However, it is unconvincing when applied to a court having 122 states parties none of which can exercise control over its decisions. 48 Moreover, since the immunity of officials from the jurisdiction of the courts of foreign states can be shown to exist in the practice of states accepted as law, to extend this immunity to cover also proceedings before international courts and tribunals would require evidence of practice of states accepted as law, which does not exist. 49 Quite the contrary, if anything given the history of international criminal law adumbrated in, for example, the ICC decisions in Malawi and Chad, there appears to be practice going in the other direction i.e. towards excluding immunity. . These countries, the statement continues, has a 'proprietorship' over the ICC. 49 In this regard, the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, supra note 11, at § § 58 and 59, where the Court makes it clear that the rules relating jurisdiction of national courts, including immunities applicable before them, should be distinguished from the same relating to international courts. 50 of States Parties. At any rate, until such a time as an amendment has been passed, from the perspective of the ICC, Article 46Abis should be a non-issue.
Conclusion
The expansion of the jurisdiction of the AU Court to include also international crimes has raised much controversy in international criminal justice circles -both diplomatic and academic. Even more controversial has been the decision by the AU to make provision for immunities of certain officials before the AU Court in the form Article 46Abis. In the back and forth of arguments for and against Article 46Abis, normative policy arguments, empirical statements and doctrinal arguments have been lumped together in a way that can result in confusion. This confusion has aided in the perpetuation of the hero-villain trend in which supporters of the ICC see themselves as heroes and the AU as villains and the supporters of the AU see themselves as heroes and the ICC as villains.
In the eagerness to put on the white hat and fight the evil other, basic principles of international law are conveniently covered in a heap of rhetoric and slightly bent doctrine.
Much of the confusion created by the debate arises from the failure by commentators to make a distinction between the law relating to immunity and the wisdom (or desirability) of Article 46Abis. Supporters of Article 46Abis present it as salvaging international law and reclaiming the foundational international principle of sovereignty by preserving immunity. What is ignored in this narrative is that international law rules on immunity apply to the exercise of jurisdiction by domestic courts over officials of a foreign state and that customary international law neither requires immunity before international courts nor prevents it.
Opponents of Article 46Abis, on the other hand, present it as doing harm to the fight against impunity by protecting officials from the reach of international courts. What is ignored is that the expansion of the jurisdiction of the African Court does not, in any way, affect the jurisdiction of other courts, including the ICC, and can in no way prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by those courts over individuals who may be immune from prosecution before the African Court by virtue of Article 46Abis.
